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SOCIAL CAPITAL AND EQUALITY:  
TOCQUEVILLE’S LEGACY
Rethinking social capital in relation with income inequalities 
Emanuele FERRAGINA* 
Susanne Langer (1942), in her book Philosophy in a New Key, 
describes how certain ideas emerge in the intellectual debate; they 
seem to promise that they will resolve all fundamental problems, 
clarify all obscure issues. “Everyone snaps them up as the open 
sesame of some new positive science, the conceptual centre-point 
around which a comprehensive system of analysis can be built” 
(Geertz, 1973:3). The strength of these new paradigms crowd out all 
other theories for a while, but after gaining familiarity with them, we 
realize that they cannot solve our intellectual problems and excessive 
popularity progressively ends. Only at this stage is a more settled 
reflection on a new paradigm possible. Social Capital concept, 
doubtless, falls into this category of ideas. After two decades of 
intense debate, we may analyse it without overemphasis, pointing out 
the importance of its emergence, its historical roots but also the limit 
of its use.      
The modern emergence of this concept renewed academic interest 
for an old debate in social science: the relationship between trust, 
social networks and the development of modern industrial societies. 
Social capital theory has gained importance mainly, through the 
integration of classical sociological theory with the description of an 
intangible form of capital. In this way the classical definition of capital 
has been overcome allowing us to tackle social issues in a new 
manner.  
*I am indebted to the comments and advice offered by Peter Pritchard and 
Martin Seeleib-Kaiser. 
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The opportunity to adapt the concept to many phenomena relies 
on the intrinsic multidimensional nature of this form of capital 
(Putnam; 1993). Social capital has been used widely to enlighten the 
following topics1: differences in economic development (Woolcock 
and Narayan, 2000; Putnam, 1993; Dasgupta, 1997), policies of local 
development (Hanifan, 1916; Trigiglia, 2001), integration of social 
networks into the definition of the utility function of individuals 
(Becker, 1996; Coleman, 1988-1990), the importance of traditional 
community values (Fukuyama, 1995), social class perpetuation and 
social immobility (Bourdieu, 1980), the decline of ‘civicness’ and 
generalized trust in developed countries (Putnam, 1993-1995-2000) 
and the relationship between generalized trust in society and the 
development of efficient institutions (Rothstein, 2001).  
Therefore, the use of social capital in many contexts has resulted 
in some confusion and misuse. In order to find a clear definition, to 
operationalize the concept and create instruments of measurement 
(Putnam, 1993; Paxton, 1999; Costa and Kahn, 2003; Hall, 1999; 
Rothstein, 2001; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Van Oorschot and Art, 
2005; Beugelsdijk, Van Schaik, 2005) a long and intense debate has 
been generated, engaging scholars with different backgrounds. 
This passionate participation in the debate has heavily impacted 
on the connotation of the concept and social capital progressively 
become a device to engage in strong ‘ideological debates’, leading to 
the re-elaboration of old theories with intensive data analysis. The 
most famous and debated conceptualization, that of Robert Putnam 
(1993, 2000), explains this development well. It had been conceived, 
in fact, with a ‘strong ideological flavour’ and presented as an original 
and objective reflection on the absence of collective actions in certain 
Italian regions and the decline of trust in American society. His 
reflection, instead, calls to mind old theories2, replacing some old-
fashioned terms3 and shifting the interest of the debate from 
‘collective and structural problems’ to the ‘individual decisions of 
citizens’.  
The purpose of this paper, in this regard, is to reflect theoretically 
upon the development of the social capital concept and its relation 
with income inequalities, in order to clarify the dangers of an ‘overly 
culturalistic’ vision, which does not take into account the structural 
problems of our society. The dimension of inequalities, in this 
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context, has been deliberately left out of the debate only for 
‘ideological reasons’. To clarify this argument, we need to revisit 
classical sociological theory in relation with social capital debate and 
Putnam’s conceptualization, to point out at the end new paths for 
further research. 
HISTORICAL EMERGENCE OF THE CONCEPT
The social capital concept is linked to an old debate, and attempts 
to propose a synthesis between the values contained in the 
communitarian approaches and individualism professed by the 
‘Rational Choice Theory’. In fact, social capital can only be generated 
collectively thanks to the presence of communities, or particular 
networks, but individuals and groups can exploit it at the same time. 
Individuals can use the social capital of their networks to achieve 
‘private’ objectives and groups can use it to enforce a certain set of 
norms or behaviours. In this sense, social capital is generated 
collectively but it can also be used individually, bridging the 
dichotomized approach ‘communitarianism’ versus ‘individualism’.   
Historically, the power of ‘community governance’ has been 
stressed by many philosophers from Antiquity to the 18th century, 
from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas and Edmund Burke (Bowles and 
Gintis, 2002). This vision was strongly criticized at the end of the 18th
century with the development of the idea of the Homo Economicus and 
subsequently with ‘Rational Choice Theory’. Such a set of theories 
became dominant in the last centuries, but many thinkers questioned 
the complicated relationship between ‘modern society’ and the 
importance of ‘old institutions’. 4
In this regard, the debate ‘community versus modernization of 
society and individualism’ has been the most discussed topic among 
the founding fathers of sociology (Tönnies, 1887; Durkheim 1893; 
Simmel, 1905; Weber 1922, 1946). They were obsessed with the idea 
that industrialization and urbanization were transforming social 
relationships in an irreversible way. They observed a breakdown of 
traditional bonds and the progressive development of anomie and 
alienation in society (Willmott, 1986). 
The distinction that Tönnies (1887) made between ‘Gemeinschaft’ 
and ‘Gesellschaft’, illustrating the historical shift from the community 
to the modern society, is particularly interesting. The attributes of the 
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first term5 differ from the less bonding attributes associated with the 
second term, symbol of the modern society. This distinction, in fact, 
is widely used in the modern analysis of social capital, Putnam calls it 
to mind using the term bonding (which is similar to 
Tönnies’Gemeinschaft) and bridging (which is similar to Tönnies’ 
Gesellschaft). 
Weber in his essay “Churches and Sects” (1946) highlighted, well 
in advance of social capital theorists, how religious sects formed 
robust informal networks able to enforce rules and create 
relationships among the members. Weber distinguished the sects 
from the churches for their ‘exclusivity’ and their ability to create a 
barrier to access. Churches, according to the German sociologist, 
were too ‘inclusive and ascriptive’ (Cornwell, 2007) to generate 
‘closeness’ in the network. Bourdieu (1980) will emphasize this 
aspect, many years later, underlying how ‘closeness’ and ‘exclusivity’ 
are the most important characteristics that allow groups to create club 
goods like social capital.  
After Tonnie’s and Weber’s works, reflection on social links in 
modern society continued with interesting contributions in the 1950s 
and 1960s, in particular with the ‘The Mass Society Theory’(Bell, 
1962; Nisbet, 1969; Stein, 1960; Whyte, 1956). They proposed themes 
similar to those of the ‘founding fathers’, placing a pessimistic 
emphasis on the development of society and its desegregation. 
Modernization inevitably leads to confusion and disorganization, 
which is why it was important to return to communitarian values. In 
the words of Stein (1960:1): “The price for maintaining a society that 
encourages cultural differentiation and experimentation is 
unquestionably the acceptance of a certain amount of disorganization 
on both the individual and social level”. All these reflections 
contribute remarkably to the development of the social capital 
concept in the following decades. 
The appearance of modern social capital conceptualization is, in 
fact, a new way to look at this debate, keeping together the 
importance of community to build generalized trust and at the same 
time, the importance of individual free choice, in order to create a 
more cohesive society. It is for this reason that social capital 
generated so much interest in the academic and political world (Rose, 
2000).
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The first appearance of the concept, with the exception of 
Hanifan6 (1916), is at the beginning of 1960’s in a famous book by 
Jane Jacobs (1961) called The Death and Life of Great American Cities. 
Social capital is used as a device to criticize the artificial development 
of American cities. Urban spaces were designed without taking into 
account pre-existing social links, destroying a capital which would be 
impossible to reproduce. Jacobs proposes a constructive way to look 
at social relationships, as a factor to consider in city planning and as 
an important value to be kept in modern societies. 
After Jacobs’ contribution, it is only with Bourdieu (1980) twenty 
years later, that the concept assume its actual ideological and 
theoretical connotation standing in the midst of sociological debate, 
affirming the importance of traditional institutions and affiliation to 
communities also in a modern society.  
Before Bourdieu, some authors highlighted the impact of social 
relations in social structure and public policies, without using the 
word social capital but describing similar phenomena. Particularly 
insightful have been the contributions of Bott (1957) and Mitchell 
(1969) to reflect upon how external relationships transform private 
institution; Granovetter (1973) who bridged the gulf between micro 
and macro in his analysis of the labour market, and finally Banfield 
(1958).
The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Banfield, 1958) is the basis for 
Putnam’s modern conceptualization. Banfield analysed a small village 
in ‘Basilicata’, in order to explain the absence of ‘collective actions’ in 
Southern Italy. Putnam (1993), 35 years later, re-formulated the 
indicators7 created by Banfield using a quantitative flavour, He 
described, contrary to his predecessor at Harvard, using a macro-
context, the different institutional performance of Italian regions after 
their institution in the 1970’s. Making Democracy Work is the first 
attempt to measure social capital and its impact on political 
institutions. His controversial contribution has the merit of 
introducing a quantitative dimension in the debate on social capital. 
Looking at this long debate, we can reclaim the historical 
importance of the term, stating that social capital is a new concept 
generated from an old idea.  
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THE RISE OF THE MODERN DEBATE
The modern debate on social capital arose after the publication of 
a short two-page article by Bourdieu (1980). In his provisional notes 
on social capital, the French sociologist defined the concept, giving to 
it visibility and recognition at an academic level. Social capital, in his 
vision, is constituted by the resources actually or potentially owned, 
which are related to the possession of a durable network of relations 
(institutionalized or not). In other words social capital is created 
through the belonging to some group, where people are endowed 
with common properties and also with permanent and stable links.  
Bourdieu inserted social capital theory in the context of the 
reproduction of social status, as a determining factor of stratification. 
According to him, social capital is a factor that increases inequalities 
in society, giving a tool to ‘upper class people’ to reproduce their own 
status. After this article many scholars concentrated their efforts on 
the analysis of social capital, basing their research on strong 
ideological positions. 
The main contemporary approaches on social capital analysis 
originate from different points of view on many important aspects: 
the role of the individual in society and their duties (Fukuyama, 1995; 
Pizzorno, 1999, Sudgen, 2000); their capacity to make ‘rational 
choices’ and the impact they receive from different groups (Coleman, 
1990; Becker, 1996); the evaluation of the institutional role 
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Rothstein and Stolle, 2003) and the 
Welfare State (Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005); the importance 
attributed to ‘strong and weak ties’ (Granovetter, 1973); the perpetual 
tension between community and society (Bagnasco, 1999); its 
possible negative impact (Portes, 1998); the evolution of a neo-capital 
theory that postulates the shift from a class-based to an actor-based 
perspective (Lin, 2000). 
In this way, the social capital concept helped many scholars 
explain their vision. It provided an important impulse in the 
development of new ways of thinking in sociology, economy and 
political science. Good examples of innovation inspired from the 
notion of social capital are the introduction of social relations in the 
individual utility function by Becker (1996) and Coleman (1990) and 
the important debate on public policy, systems of governance and 
informal networks.  
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The social capital concept nevertheless has to be looked at 
critically too. It inherently hides, in fact, the will of many scholars to 
come back to the old discussion of community versus society. This 
point has been clearly highlighted by Thomson (2005), in his article, 
“The Theory That Won’t Die: From Mass Society to the Decline of 
Social Capital”. She clearly linked the emergence of the social capital 
concept to the debates that took place in the 1950’s and in the 1960’s 
around mass society theory8. In its most famous conceptualization 
(Putnam; 1993), it has been used instrumentally in order to justify the 
need for a new vision of the world, in which institutional power and 
welfare state provisions have a minor role compared to the one 
reserved to the renewal of civic society through a new communitarian 
spirit.  
Despite the limits of Putnam’s definition, social capital can be 
used in a different way to support new ‘intellectual struggles’ against 
social immobility and inequalities, because with it we can go far 
beyond the analyses based on the other types of capital, revealing new 
issues by looking at old research topics from a new angle. It is for this 
reason that Putnam’s books have been so hotly debated. His attempt 
to give a ‘quantitative dimension’ to the relation between social 
capital, institutions and social performance, constitutes a valid 
departure point for new analyses. In what follows, the main criticisms 
of his famous books are discussed in order to forge a new research 
path. 
CRITICISM OF PUTNAM’S SOCIAL CAPITAL VISION AND GAPS IN THE 
LITERATURE
Putnam’s thoughts can only be understood if we look at the 
evolution of his two most important books: Making Democracy Work 
and Bowling Alone (Putnam, 1993, 2000). Making Democracy Work
(Putnam, 1993) can be considered a valuable exercise in refining the 
explanatory power of the social capital concept. By following the 
institution and development of Italian regions from the 1970s, he 
made a case for measuring the impact of ‘cultural and social aspects’ 
on institutional performance. Making Democracy Work can be 
considered a preliminary study to introduce the theoretical tools 
developed in Bowling Alone, in order to analyse the American society.  
In fact it is only in Bowling Alone (Putnam, 2000) that Putnam’s 
research questions evolve: What has caused the decline9 of social 
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capital in the most ‘associative’ democracy10 since the 1960’s? How 
can American democracy continue to operate properly? What are the 
levers to ‘Renew American society’ and escape from the perspective 
of a disaggregated society? The answer that Putnam gave to these 
questions began one of the hottest debates in the history of social 
science not only in the United States, but also in Europe and the rest 
of the world. 
Putnam’s analysis has been challenged at an empirical level by 
further research in the United States, as shown by Costa and Kahn 
(2003), who analysed different research projects on social capital. 
These attempts to measure social capital in the United States led to 
discordant results. In three of them no change in social capital 
endowment was found; in another they found an increase. Therefore 
the authors obtained a mix of stability and decline and only Putnam 
found a strong decline. 
Paxton’s article (1999) “Is Social Capital Declining in the United 
States? A Multiple Indicator Assessment”, takes particular issue with 
Putnam’s analysis. She contested Putnam’s results, highlighting a 
point that will be central in this discussion: that the decline appears 
only in marginalized people and not among the entire American 
population. 
In Europe many scholars have tried to provide similar 
measurements, initially for countries; England (Hall, 1999) and 
Sweden (Rothstein, 2001); then for the rest of Europe, looking also at 
the impact of the Welfare State (Van Oorshot, 2005). However none 
of them found a decline to be taking place. 
Strong and radical critiques come from other scholars, who have 
argued that many of Putnam’s arguments are based more on 
normative judgements rather than empirical evidence. From a 
methodological point of view the critiques of O’Connel (2003) and 
Knack and Keefer (1997) are very interesting. According to them we 
cannot explain every economic improvement in terms of social 
capital and association density11.
The critiques that follow are presented in four groups. The first 
argues that there is a strong incoherence between Making democracy 
work and Bowling Alone; the second that the ‘ideological’ use of social 
capital goes back to communitarian theories; thirdly that there are 
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‘normative’ judgements on the relations between government 
intervention and the social capital endowment of a nation; finally, and 
the most significant for this discussion, is the use of social capital 
theory to shift the attention from structural and collective problems 
of Western democracies, such as economic inequalities, to individual 
issues of responsibility. 
INCOHERENCE BETWEEN MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK AND BOWLING 
ALONE
The first problem highlighted by the appearance of the article 
“Bowling Alone” (Putnam, 1995) is the incongruity with Making 
Democracy Work (Putnam, 1993). The strong contradiction was 
pinpointed by Lemann (1996) in his article “Kicking in Groups”, in 
which he draws a comparison between the works of Putnam (1993, 
1995) and Banfield (1958, 1970), showing that Putnam used a 
different logic and methodology to analyse social capital evolution in 
the United States and in Italy. 
The need to ‘Renew American Society’ appears stronger than the 
historical determinism showed in Making Democracy Work (Lemann, 
1996:24). History and the system of government in place 900 years 
ago still have an impact on the difference of social capital among 
Italian regions, but in the United States the American scholar 
observed a fast decline in 40 years. Why is it that in Italy he applied a 
‘path dependency theory’ and in the United States social capital 
appears to be in rapid decline? 
Putnam’s idea seems to be constructed to show that the United 
States has the possibility for a complete renewal; it seems to be a 
theory built to put new hope in social links and the power of 
associations.12 Following the logic of Making Democracy Work would 
have meant to describe an irreversible decline; social capital is in fact 
the product of a long and intense history. For this reason Putnam’s 
incoherence shows how all the quantitative analyses are in reality 
driven by a strong political message: to give the United States new 
motivation to re-launch social relations and the old character of the 
nation admired by Tocqueville at the begin of 19th century. 
A second argument used by Lemann (1996) to demonstrate 
Putnam’s incoherence, can be shown if we compare his books with 
Banfield’s analysis. Banfield (1958, 1970, 1974) applied the same 
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deterministic theory to explain the backwardness of people in 
southern Italy and in American ghettos. The result was massive 
criticism and accusation of racism for his controversial book The 
UnheavenlyCity. Lemann suggested that Bowling Alone avoids Banfield’s 
problem.
A true application of the line of thinking in Making Democracy Work
would require searching in the United States for internal differences in 
the civic virtue and then trying to explain those differences. One 
inevitable result would be the shining of a harsh spotlight on the 
ghettos, with their high rates of crime, welfare dependency, and family 
break up (Lemann; 1996: 26). 
Putnam doesn’t consider different economic conditions and the 
lack of social capital of poor families in the urban ghettos and in this 
way avoids Banfield’s problem. 
In fact, Banfield (1974) is ‘deterministic’ in his judgement of the 
situation in urban ghettos, making a parallel between the condition of 
poor families in Basilicata and those in American towns. Everything 
in his analysis is dependent on cultural factors which reproduce 
themselves. He was accused of racism, for this vision but as shown by 
Lemann he kept, contrarily to Putnam, a coherent link between the 
two analyses. 
Putnam tried to answer these criticisms, (Putnam, 2001) showing 
how states have a different endowment of social capital directly 
dependent on historical and cultural factors. He uses the particular 
case of Utah, where the historical presence of Mormons has strongly 
impacted on the actual endowment of social capital. However not a 
line was dedicated to increasing income inequalities in his country and 
different living conditions among its citizens. What was not 
considered was the lack of public services, the absence of a national 
health service, the fact that US has the highest Gini coefficient among 
Western countries (Weinberg, 1996:1).  
What is highlighted instead is the decrease of social capital due to 
the effect of the modernization of society13 in the last forty years. In 
the chapter called “What Killed Civic Engagement? Summing Up” 
(2000: 277-284) Putnam calculated how much these variables have 
roughly contributed to this decline, keeping a margin of uncertainty 
of 10%. How is it possible to enumerate the factors that lead to a 
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disengagement with civic life and measure their impact without using 
any rigorous methodology?  
For this reason Putnam’s contribution has to be considered more 
an ‘ideological vision’ than an effective demonstration of decline of 
social capital. Decrease of reciprocity and decline of mutual trust is 
not a new idea.14It seems that Putnam returns to old sociological 
theories which emphasized the passage from a ‘traditional’ to a 
‘modern’ society trying to demonstrate that community values are still 
important. Therefore, he proposed a decisive shift in social capital 
theory. Bourdieu (1980, 1986) and Coleman (1990) in their works, in 
fact, proposed social capital as an explanatory variable useful to 
understand some phenomena in society and not as a ‘fundamental 
tool’ for the ‘renewal of a whole country’. 
A ROMANTIC COMEBACK TO COMMUNITARIANISM
The need for intermediary groups between the individuals and 
society was pinpointed by Durkheim (1893) more than a century ago. 
The fear of social disintegration in the passage from a ‘mechanic 
society’ to a ‘modern one’ was already current at the end of 19th
century.
For the French sociologist a nation can work properly only thanks 
to the mediation of secondary groups which are necessary bodies to 
interconnect ‘atomistic individuals’ to the life of a nation. A society 
that refused this model would constitute a ‘veritable sociological 
monster’. More than a century ago Durkheim, unconsciously, was 
highlighting one of the main points of social capital theory: the 
importance of social links in the functioning of a nation:  
A society composed of an infinite number of unorganized individuals, 
that a hypertrophied state is forced to oppress and contain, constitutes a 
veritable sociological monstrosity [...] A nation can be maintained only if 
between the state and the individual, there is interlaced a whole series of 
secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly 
in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general 
torrent of social life15 (Durkheim; 1893 vol. I: 29). 
This idea continued to fascinate sociologists after World War II, 
producing the advent of mass society theory. During the 1950’s and 
1960’s the development of mass society theory (Bell, 1962; Nisbet, 
1969; Stein, 1960; Whyte, 1956) represented the fear of the 
desegregation of society due to the modernization of life habits. This 
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idea is not so different from that highlighted by Fukuyama (1995) and 
Putnam (2001). Nevertheless, Mass Society Theorists proposed more 
pessimistic analyses of the ‘modern man’. Books like American as Mass 
Society (Bell, 1962), The Eclipse of Community (Stein, 1960), The 
Organization Man (Whyte, 1956) illustrate the consequence of a society 
where men are isolated and disconnected from their community. 
Particularly important in this debate was Nisbet’s contribution 
(1969). In his famous book The Quest for Community, he compared the 
different philosophical ideas which are the basis of individualism and 
communitarianism. According to him, there is a need to defend the 
forgotten traditional values of communities, from the strong 
emphasis that have been given in modern societies to concepts like 
progress, reason and freedom (Nisbet, 1969:10). According to Nisbet, 
freedom resulted in ‘disenchantment’ and ‘alienation’; men lost 
traditional ties without substituting them. ‘Disenchantment’ and 
‘alienation’ are caused by the lack of certitude connected with 
freedom; this is the price to pay for modernity.  
Nisbet goes forward looking with nostalgia at the image of the 
man in the past: the idea of ‘inadequate man’, ‘insufficient man’, 
‘disenchanted man’ are part of 20th century discourse. In the past, the 
debate was dominated by the idea of a ‘natural man’, ‘economic and 
political man’; all images which provide a positive idea of social 
connectedness.  
However, neither Nisbet nor other scholars of this school of 
thought have been able to demonstrate their propositions on the 
increasing isolation and the decline of trust in society (Thomson; 
2005). For this reason the debate slowly disappeared among scholars, 
to re-appear in the 1990’s in a new form. Thomson (2005:422) argues 
for continuity between mass society theory and the decline of the 
social capital theory postulated by Putnam. Both theories highlight 
the importance of secondary groups and current reduction of those 
ties in society. In fact in Putnam’s opinion people in the United States 
are less connected to their communities than four decades ago. But 
the ‘new theory’ of social capital (Thomson 2005) presents important 
differences from the previous one. 
First of all, the massive presence of data and empirical analysis 
(Thomson, 2005: 425), even if the presence of this evidence has not 
been useful in providing clear answers, was more objective. However, 
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the decline of social capital in the Unites States remains questionable, 
as already mentioned (Paxton, 2000).  
Secondly, the suppression of the use of the word ‘alienation’, 
substituted by  ‘lack of trust’ (Thomson, 2005:435) makes it clear that 
Putnam wants to give a more optimistic vision. There is 
desegregation but individuals can change the situation; the alienation 
of individuals from their own communities is not an irreversible 
process. In fact, the third difference between mass society and social 
capital theory is the agency attributed to individuals (Thomson, 
2005:436): people have the freedom to reduce social links. In mass 
society theory, instead, individuals were considered as part of a 
changing social structure. The effects of desegregation in society 
presented by Putnam and Fukuyama are similar to the ones presented 
by mass society scholars, but in the new theory the individual controls 
of the situation. They can decide to destroy social links and break 
relations with the traditional communities and associations. In this 
way ‘alienation’ is no longer a collective problem, but isolation comes 
from the lack of trust and integration in associations, so it is only an 
‘individual problem’. 
In this sense, Putnam’s vision is very appealing. Firstly, because 
responsibility is no longer in the hands of public powers. The 
individual has ‘agency’ and doesn’t need any structure; he can freely 
decide to renew democracy and communities. Secondly it confirms 
fears which are part of our basic assumptions; everyone wants to 
maintain security nets to counterbalance uncertainty provoked by the 
modernization of society. As underlined by Thomson, “theories that 
won’t die are those that confirm our most basic assumptions” 
(Thomson, 2005: 443). 
In this clear framework, an important big doubt remains. Putnam 
doesn’t explain to us why social capital is unequally distributed among 
social classes (Bourdieu, 1980). Should we think that the lack of social 
capital in lower classes depends upon the freedom of choice of 
individuals? Should we think that public powers must give free agency 
to individuals to make their own choices without supporting people 
who are less likely to take advantage of their social networks? And 
above all, are governments solely responsible for the destruction of 
social capital and associationism? At this stage an analysis of public 
policy impact on social capital would be appropriate. 
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GOVERNMENTAL ROLE IN GENERATING TRUST AND RECIPROCITY
The critique of central government, in terms of its destruction of 
trust and reciprocity among citizens, is very old, dating back to 1835. 
Tocqueville, with his masterpiece, De la Démocratie en Amérique
(Tocqueville, 1960), demonstrated how the role of government in 
American society was less invasive than in France, giving individuals 
more opportunity to create free associations. 
According to Tocqueville, with the progressive development of 
democratic governments, the responsibility of every individual toward 
the rest of the population would have become much clearer and 
dedication to duties for a single person less common and substituted 
by a central organization (Tocqueville, 1960: 97). However, a 
government would never be able to rebuild those links of solidarity, 
even if it would provide the same services. A central power can only 
impose rules and destroys the ‘circulation of communitarian values’ 
and informal relations. In the context of a strong central organization, 
people would only be interested in helping individuals in their close 
network, all the others will become like foreigners16 (Tocqueville, 
1960: 97).  
However, the critiques that Tocqueville made of central 
government have to be considered in their own historical context, not 
misused and stretched to explain the modern evolution of our society. 
The French writer was conditioned in his judgment by the strong 
centralization of powers that operated in his country following the 
French revolution. For him the only way to increase the well-being of 
a country was through the strong presence of associations, in order to 
increase horizontal links able to counterbalance the vertical power of 
‘democratic institutions’.17
In recent years, the same argument that Tocqueville used against 
democracy18 in terms of the possible destruction of social capital and 
mutual trust, has been used against the Welfare State (Putnam, 2000; 
Fukuyama, 1995, Coleman, 1990), without any empirical evidence. 
The evidence from empirical studies has, instead, indicated that the 
Welfare State has not had a negative impact on social capital (Van 
Oorschot and Arts, 2005). In their article “The Social Capital of 
European Welfare States: The Crowding Out Hypothesis Revisited”, 
Van Oorschot and Arts showed that the only crowding out effect of a 
strong Welfare State on social capital19 appears in ‘trustworthiness’, 
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defined as a commitment to a common morality and social norms. 
Social networks (friends, family and political engagement) and social 
trust (measured as interpersonal trust and trust in institutions), are not 
influenced by large Welfare State expenditures and provisions. So, it 
seems that this argument is more ideological than factual.  
In this regard, Skocpol’s argumentation (1996) is pertinent for our 
discussion because she offers many reasons to challenge the 
statement that the Welfare State and public policy action in general, 
reduce social capital. For her, the argument of the community 
renewal role in increasing social capital hides a strong ‘ideological’ 
argument: the proposal to substitute the Welfare State with an 
‘opportunity society’ (Skocpol, 1996). Neo-classicists and 
communitarians, even if for different reasons, agree on the idea that 
the state should not play an active role in society. It can just provoke 
damage to communitarian values essential to keep social capital in our 
society and it has to roll back without interfering in the free market 
and communitarian life. 
Skocpol offered a strong historical counter-argument to these 
hyptheses. Their restricted vision of the role of public power in the 
creation of social capital does not take into account public support 
and partnership that the United States government has encouraged 
since the beginning of its history. In fact the government has worked 
closely with associations furnishing support and infrastructure: 
“Conservatives may imagine that popular voluntary associations and 
the Welfare State are contradictory opposites, but historically they 
have operated in close symbiosis” (Skocpol, 1996:22). Voluntary civic 
associations, in fact, have participated jointly with the government to 
create and administer welfare programs for many decades. 
Communitarians see the state as the main enemy and they often 
ignore the danger coming from a free market economy for traditional 
communities. The market can also destroy strong ties and 
relationships of reciprocity. It is evident from Skocpol’s analysis that 
those propositions against the state are derived only from strong 
‘ideological bias’ and an inaccurate analysis of reality. 
The historical argument proposed by Skocpol seems valuable also 
in Europe. In fact social capital, as measured in Van Oorschot’s 
previously mentioned study, is bigger in Nordic countries than in 
Mediterranean ones (Van Oorschot, 2005). If Putnam’s analysis, 
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which directly derives from Tocqueville, was true, we should clearly 
find far less social capital in Sweden than in Greece for example, and 
yet this is not the case. 
Skocpol goes back to Marxist theory to demonstrate that the 
government cannot be considered as a simple superstructure and nor 
can community be considered the primary institutional structure in 
the organization of a country: “Just as Marxists are wrong to assume 
that the economy is the primary “substructure” while government 
and politics are merely “superstructure”, so Tocqueville romanticists 
are wrong to assume that spontaneous social association is primary 
while government and politics are derivatives” (Skocpol, 1996: 23). In 
opposition to this vision, civic associations in the United States were 
stimulated during the American Revolution, Civil War, the New Deal, 
World War I and II by the State. On the other hand, associations 
supported the federal structure to deliver services tailored to the 
needs of local populations. Civic associations and government work 
better when there is a synergy and a mutual respect for the respective 
roles. In this sense they are complementary. So, Skocpol argues that 
to revitalize American civil society, vibrant associative networks are 
not enough, there is a need for a strong political reorganization of 
democratic systems. Only after this process can ‘civic engagement’ 
flourishes and help the development of the nation. 
The assumption presented in Bowling Alone (Putnam, 2000) that 
local voluntarism is the only primary factor of a healthy democracy is 
a normative one that has never been clearly demonstrated, as shown 
by Skocpol. This ‘normative’ assumption is supported by a mix of 
data, historical and sociological explanations that do not clearly 
connect. From this point of view Putnam’s vision is very dangerous, 
because with his work he has been able to shift the debate toward an 
individual perspective, avoiding the problem of discussing the 
structural causes that generate social trust in society.  
SHIFTING ATTENTION FROM REAL PROBLEMS TO FIND NEW WAYS TO 
‘RENEW SOCIETY’ 
Following the criticisms of incoherence, of reshaping an old 
concept with a new appealing term and the low consideration for 
state intervention in generating social capital and associative 
networks, it is time to highlight the most important limit of Putnam’s 
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analysis: the use of the concept of social capital to shift attention 
from the structural causes of desegregation in modern society. 
Putnam and other authors (such as Fukuyama) give more 
importance to cultural values rather than economic factors to 
describe disaggregation. In particular, he considered income 
inequalities only marginally in Making Democracy Wor,  and then this 
argument20 does not reappear in Bowling Alone.
The American sociologist doesn’t want to address such a 
structural issue in his theory. His aim is to furnish a demonstration of 
how “civic engagement” can renew a society. But we could argue that 
the decline of social capital in the United States (if this decline is 
demonstrable) is dependent upon the increase of inequalities. The 
American Gini coefficient is in fact the highest in western world.21
This critique of Putnam is well discussed in an interesting article 
by O’Connel, called “Anti Social Capital. Civic Values Versus 
Economic Equality in the EU” (O’Connel, 2003). The redistribution 
of economic wealth is a complicated issue and perhaps it seems easier 
to avoid the problem, trying instead to demonstrate that alienation 
and disaggregation can be reduced simply by building more cohesive 
societies:  
Rather, an active interest in their local football club will suffice to turn 
‘ghetto mums’ into ‘soccer mums’. Vibrant bird-watching associations, 
busy rotary clubs, and regular philatelic conventions will start the wheels 
of progress rolling. This is not a caricature of the position; in Bowling 
Alone, these are precisely the sorts of measures set forth for renewing 
the stock of social capital (O’Connel; 2003: 247). 
O’Connel with his position gives us a new key to read Putnam’s 
works and all the attention that politics and mass media have paid to 
social capital. It is much easier to demand more participation in 
associations rather than working on the structural causes of social 
disaggregation.  
The real problem is not ‘civic participation’, but inequalities. In 
fact, income equality seems to be more correlated to economic and 
social development than social capital (O’Connel; 2003) and what is 
more, economic equality explains the evolution of dependent 
variables such as transparency of institutions, R&D spending and 
social satisfaction more than social capital. For this reason it is 
problematic (in addition to all the reasons highlighted in the previous 
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sections) and also incorrect (in the light of quantitative evidence) to 
consider social capital as an elixir to improve every crucial aspect of 
society. In what follows, we explore income inequalities in Italian 
regions to discuss this crucial aspect.  
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INCOME INEQUALITIES IN ITALIAN REGIONS
To understand the different performances of democratic 
institutions Putnam (1993) undertook the famous study of Italian 
regions. He argues that the main cause of the divergent institutional 
performances between the South and the North is the presence of a 
different degree of civic engagement. The degree of civic engagement 
is measured through the endowment of social capital of every region.   
Firstly, the study considers institutions as an independent variable 
to explore how institutional change affects the identities, power and 
strategy of political actors. Secondly, institutions are considered as a 
dependent variable to analyse how their performance has been 
conditioned by history (Putnam, 1993:9). In order to study 
institutional performance the measurement was assessed with four 
tests, ‘comprehensiveness’, ‘internal consistence’ (looking at 
performance in single dimensions), ‘reliability’, ‘correspondence to 
the objectives and evaluations presented in the study’ (Putnam, 1993: 
64). Putnam proposed a compound indicator (respondent to these 
four principles) to measure institutional performance.22
Socio-economic modernity and civic community development are 
the two main factors that explain institutional performance 
divergence. Nevertheless, according to Putnam, too much emphasis 
has been posed on the classical argument of wealth and socio-
economic development. The huge difference between the North and 
the South of Italy cannot be explained only by this factor. It is 
necessary to go back to Machiavelli’s concept of civic virtue to give a 
comprehensive explanation. 
Putnam revitalizes the importance of civic virtue using the 
concept of ‘civicness’ that he measured through social capital (he 
proposed an indicator based on outcomes).23 In his model he 
attempted to demonstrate that civicness is more correlated to 
institutional performance than socio-economic development, 
therefore, social capital is more important than socio-economic 
factors to predict the success of institutions. But wealth (measured 
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through the GDP) is not the only socio-economic factor that should 
be taken into account. 
Discussing social capital implies the analyses of social 
cohesiveness and participation in society. The GDP per capita, at this 
regard is not the only socio-economic variable to play a role. We tend 
to create links with others mainly when we meet someone with a 
similar social-status (Bourdieu, 1980). So we may argue that 
egalitarian societies foster cohesiveness and participation, therefore 
creation of social capital. It is interesting to notice that Italian regions 
with higher and more rapidly increasing Gini coefficients are the ones 
that Putnam identified as less civic (Table 1). 
Calabria, Campania, Sicily, Puglia, Molise, Abruzzo and Sardegna 
have the lowest value for Putnam’s measures of civic community and 
also for our regional Gini coefficient24 (1993). Southern regions are 
already characterized by a slower socio-economic development and 
by a diffused incapacity of the inhabitants to act collectively. The 
increase of the Gini coefficient in 18 regions out of 20, in the last two 
decades must have warned policy makers. In reality this issue has 
been completely absent from political debate. In this regard, 
overemphasis attributed to cultural values (justified and supported by 
social capital debate) to explain the poor institutional performance of 
Southern regions hides the danger of underestimating the impact of 
increasing inequalities on the efficiency of institutions and the 
generation of trust in the society. 
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Tab. 1 - Gini Coefficient Italian regions (1989-2000) 
Region 
Gini 
Coefficient 
1989 
Gini 
Coefficient 
2000 
Variation
1989-2000 
% 
Piemonte 0.30 0.29 -4.48 
Val D’aosta nd nd nd 
Lombardia 0.28 0.30 8.51 
Liguria 0.27 0.30 11.96 
Trentino 0.27 0.27 1.77 
Veneto 0.26 0.31 18.00 
Friuli 0.25 0.30 18.01 
Emilia Romagna 0.26 0.29 10.70 
Toscana 0.25 0.27 10.45 
Umbria 0.24 0.24 -0.44 
Marche 0.24 0.30 21.66 
Lazio 0.29 0.28 -3.53 
Abruzzo 0.27 0.38 42.37 
Molise 0.26 0.36 37.72 
Campania 0.30 0.34 13.91 
Puglia 0.29 0.33 15.48 
Basilicata 0.22 0.27 20.99 
Calabria 0.23 0.32 34.63 
Sicilia 0.31 0.38 23.42 
Sardegna 0.30 0.33 9.83 
Source: Own calculations from LIS (Luxembourg Income Study). 
CONCLUSION
The paper critically discusses the historical and political 
importance of the Social Capital concept, placing a particular 
emphasis on a critical re-evaluation of Putnam’s idea, in order to 
underline the importance of the relation between social capital and 
equality. In order to achieve this objective, four criticisms have been 
spelled out.  
The first, proposed by Lemann (1996) regards the presence of 
incoherence between the historical arguments presented in Making 
Democracy Work, to justify the difference between the South and the 
North of Italy, and Bowling Alone where the historical dimension is not 
taken into account. The second proposed by Thomson (2005) regards 
the use of social capital theory to return to an old debate: society 
versus community. In this sense Putnam’s use of the social capital 
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concept has the function of shifting attention from structural 
problems of society like ‘alienation’ to individual responsibility. The 
responsibility for social inclusion is no longer explained by a lack of 
engagement of public powers but it is exclusively owned by 
individuals. 
The third criticism formulated by Skocpol (1996) is strictly 
connected to the second. It regards the importance of public powers 
in the generation of trust and reciprocity. According to Skocpol, 
American civic engagement has been historically supported by the 
State. Without the partnership of the State, American democracy and 
civic engagement would never have flourished. The fourth criticism 
takes into account the previous ones, expanding on the importance of 
equality in the generation of social capital. The success of social 
capital theory has contributed to shifting the debate from the 
collective nature of socio-economic problems to the conviction that 
individual engagement can be the elixir to renew society. In this 
regard, in order to rediscover the importance and the limits of social 
capital concept, there is a need to go back to the original 
Tocqueville’s conception. 
Starting from the assumption that the generation of social capital 
is important to improve the socio-economic condition of a country, it 
is argued that there is a strong correlation between the generation of 
social capital and income equality. Putnam attributed the lack of 
social capital in Southern regions mainly to cultural and historical 
variables. In the article it is shown, through the measurement of the 
Gini coefficient, how  regions with highest coefficients tend to have 
the lowest levels of social capital. From this consideration, new 
research can be undertaken, with the aim of generalizing the first 
conclusions discussed for the Italian case. Europe is a unique case to 
verify this hypothesis at a regional level. Countries like Belgium, Italy, 
United Kingdom, Germany and Spain contain regions with peculiar 
histories and different levels of reciprocity and trust. 
Testing the relationship between inequalities and social capital in 
this context would allow us to verify empirically Tocqueville’s original 
hypothesis. Putnam recalls the romantic myth, that a society 
exceptionally involved in local social life is able to guarantee the best 
level of social performance. But the American scholar ‘surprisingly’ 
forgot, in his famous analysis, the main argument that Tocqueville 
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used to explain the difference between American and European 
populations in the 19th century. For Tocqueville, in fact, the most 
important difference was not the associationism or the form of 
government, but the equality of conditions: “Parmi les objets 
nouveaux qui, pendant mon séjour aux Etats-Unis, ont attire mon 
attention, aucun n’a plus vivement frappé mes regards que l’égalité 
des conditions” (Tocqueville; 1960:8). The French social scientist was 
already aware of the importance of equality of conditions in building 
a cohesive society. 
NOTES
 [1] The article refers to social capital in social theory and economic 
development. The concept has been fruitfully used in other contexts: 
1.Families and youth behaviour problems, 2. Schooling and education, 3. 
Community life, 4.Work and organization, 5.Democracy and governance; 
6.General cases of collective problems. For a detailed literature review 
see Woolcock (2000, note 20 page 195). 
[2] The reference is clearly to Tönnies, Durkheim, Tocqueville and Weber. 
[3] Such as ‘alienation’ with ‘trust’.. 
[4] In particular, family and traditional communities.
[5] He considered kinship, neighbourhood and friendship as part of the 
‘Gemeinschaft’ which constitute the ‘pillars’ of a particular dimension of 
social capital, commonly labelled in the literature ‘social networks’. 
[6] She described the importance of social capital to improve the quality of 
life of a rural community.  
[7] Putnam took from Banfield the idea to measure newspaper readership, 
density of associative networks and electoral vote. 
[8] Thomson’s arguments is discussed in the section ‘A Romantic Come 
Back to Communitarianism’.  
[9] He detected four main factors (giving a detailed breakdown) of decline in 
the United States: the rise of female participation in the work market, 
which reduced the time available to participate in associations; the 
increase of mobility, stability of residence is directly correlated with a 
stronger civic engagement; changes in family structure (more divorces); 
the technological transformation of leisure, for example the revolution 
created by television. The symbol of this crisis is the phenomenon of 
“Solo Bowling” more people bowl without participating in leagues or 
without joining associations. According to Putnam the increase of 
tertiary groups (which present a less cohesive structure) and non-profit 
associations in environmental fields are not important enough in terms 
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of social connectedness to counterbalance the decline of classical forms 
of associations, the ones that produce more social capital. In other 
words, modernization of society is bringing a reduction of social capital.  
[10] Putnam refers to United States. 
[11] O’Connel’s point of view is discussed in the section ‘Shifting Attention 
Form Real Problems to Find New Ways to Renew Society’.. 
[12] This is the reason why it has been so appreciated at political level. 
[13] The causes of decline highlighted by Putnam have been exposed in note 
9. 
[14] As analysed in the next section. 
[15] Original version: “Une société composée d’une poussière infinie 
d’individus inorganisés, qu’un Etat hypertrophié s’efforce d’enserrer et 
de retenir, constitue une véritable monstruosité sociologique [...] Une 
nation ne peut se maintenir que si, entre l’Etat et le particulier, s’intercale 
toute une série de groupes secondaires qui soient assez proches des 
individus pour les attirer fortement dans leur sphère d’action et les 
entraîner ainsi dans le torrent général de la vie sociale”.  
[16] “Les plus proches seuls intéressent. Chaque classe venant à se 
rapprocher des autres et à s’y mêler, ses membres deviennent indifférents 
et comme étrangers entre eux” (Tocqueville; 1960: 97). 
[17] We have also to appreciate that the post-revolutionary French context 
was far less democratic than the American one studied by Tocqueville at 
the beginning of the 19th century. 
[18] And against a strong government. 
[19] In his article Van Oorschot defines social capital as the sum of three 
elements, trustworthiness, social trust and social networks.  
[20]  “The effectiveness of regional government is closely tied to the degree 
to which authority and social interchange in the life of the region is 
organized horizontally or hierarchically. Equality is an essential feature of 
the civic community” (Putnam, 1993: 105). 
[21] At this regard see Weinberg (1996:1). 
[22] Twelve indicators, divided into ‘policy pronouncements’ and ‘policy 
implementation’, are used in order to measure institutional performance: 
- For policy pronouncements: cabinet stability (number of cabinets in 10 
years); budget promptness (average level of delay to complete action of 
their annual budgets); breadth of their statistical and informational 
facilities; reform legislation (in different areas: economic development, 
territorial and environmental planning and social services; looking at 
comprehensiveness, coherence and creativeness); legislative innovation. 
For policy implementations: day care centers (number of centers for 
number of children); family clinics; industrial policy instruments (plan 
implementations, looking at: regional economic development; regional 
land use; industrial plan; regional development finance agencies; 
industrial development and marketing consortia; job-training programs); 
agricultural spending capacity; local health unit expenditures; housing 
and urban development; bureaucratic responsiveness. 
[23] The indicator is made up of four items: number of associations, 
newspaper readership, electoral turnout, the incidence of preference 
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vote. In the following years social capital has been measured mainly 
through survey data rather than outcomes. 
[24] Gini coefficient is calculated according to Mahler’s article ‘Exploring the 
Subnational Dimension of Income Inequality: An Analysis of the 
Relationship Between Inequality and Electoral Turnout in the Developed 
Countries’ (2002). Mahler described in detail what this definition of 
income includes: “More specifically, this definition includes such private 
sources of income as wages and salaries; income from self-employment; 
interest, rents, and property income received on a regular basis; 
occupational pensions; regular inter-household cash transfers; and court-
ordered payments such as alimony and child support. Also included is 
income from public benefit programs, including sick pay; disability pay; 
retirement benefits; child or family allowances; unemployment 
compensation; maternity pay; military, veterans’, or war benefits; and 
means-tested public assistance” (Mahler, 2002:119). 
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